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The  plan  of  this  paper  is  to  explore  popular  approaches  to  en-
vironmental  problem  definition.  One  I  have  called  the  engineering
mentality,  which  frequently  omits  reference  to  man.  Another  is  the
gut  feeling  approach,  which  tries  to  draw  a  dichotomy  between  effi-
ciency  and  human values.  The institutional  implications  of these  ap-
proaches  will be  traced.  This  is  followed by  an  analysis  of the role of
collective  action,  in  which  I  shall  criticize  the  polarization  of  the
issue  into  one  of  more  versus  less  government.  I  shall  also  criticize
the  present  focus  of  interest  group  bargaining  on  specific  govern-
mental  action  and  projects  rather  than  on  system-wide  rules  and
policy.  Then,  a  suggestion  is  put  forward  for  a  more  fundamental
kind of reformation  in our property  rights. Finally,  I shall  explore  the
institution  of  policy  education  and  its  role  in  environmental  rule
making.
MAN  AND  HIS  INSTITUTIONAL  ENVIRONMENT
This country-its people-is  sick,  and  it will take  big  changes-
yes,  a  reformation-to  make  it  well.  The  sickness  may  be  described
in terms  of  substandard  houses,  race  riots  and  property  destruction,
numbers  of  families  living  in poverty,  respiratory  ailments  related  to
pollution,  and the death rate of black  infants.  All of these  ills  suggest
a  need  for  technological  solutions.  For example,  we  can  look  for  a
construction  technology  breakthrough  to  solve  the  housing  problem,
better equipped police  to control riots,  more doctors  to  reduce  infant
deaths,  better  engineered  highways  to  reduce  traffic  deaths,  or better
weapons  to end  the Vietnam  War.
Another dimension  of the  problem  is  described  more in  terms  of
human  relationships.  As  of  April  22,  1970,  there  were  already  142
murders  in the city  of Detroit  and  50  suicides.  Murder seems  to be  a
lower  social  class phenomenon,  while  suicide  is  shared  by  the  upper
classes.  U.S.  Public Health  Service reports  estimate  that one  in twelve
persons  in the United States is  suffering  from some form of mental  ill-
ness.  Many  people  are  on drugs  or  tranquilizers,  or  are  alcoholics.
There  are no  figures  on  alienation  or  general  dropouts,  or  an  index
of uptightness.  These  afflict both the rich and the poor.
112If  we  look  at  mankind  as  the  ultimate  product  and  measure  of
our total environment  and economy,  we  cannot help but be  depressed
with  our condition  relative  to our  potential.  We have been  using  our
resources  largely  without  consideration  of  the  opportunity  costs  in
terms of the total human being produced.  There is more than marginal
room  for improvement  in the  human product,  and  its  realization  in-
volves  much  more  than  technological  manipulations  or  small  in-
stitutional  changes,  which often go  together.
The  issue  is  how  far  do  people  want to  go  in  changing  relation-
ships  among  themselves.  Institutions  are  simply  collective  action  for
relating  people  to each  other in an  orderly fashion.  If we  believe that
the  problems  of  environmental  management  are  just  pimples  on  a
basically  sound  body,  simple  extensions  of  existing  institutions  will
do.  But  if  we  believe  that  the  problems  are  more  serious,  then  the
institutional  analysis  is far different.
THE  ENGINEERING  MENTALITY
In the  approach  to  environmental  management  which  might  be
called the  engineering  mentality,  questions  about  the overall  direction
of  the  management  effort  are  seldom  asked.  Attention  is  given  pri-
marily  to  alternative  techniques  and  means.  This  is  characteristic  of
much  public  works  planning.  The  population  trend  of  a  given  area
is projected,  then put together  with a per capita consumption  rate,  and
a need  for the product  is stated  for some future period.  The problem
then  is  only  to  find  the  best  method  for  meeting  this  need.  If  the
methods  have  an  impact on  the  environment,  the  problem  is  one  of
amelioration  and  finding  the  method  with  the  least  objectionable
effects.  A  common  feature  of  this  approach  is  that the  question  of
why  should  this future  population  be  in  this  location  at  all  is  never
asked.
We  can  see  the  engineering  mentality  in  such  agencies  as  the
Bureau  of  Public  Roads,  Corps  of Engineers,  or even  some  colleges
of  agriculture.  It helps  to  have  a  single  purpose  agency  tied  to  one
kind of product with a vertical tie  to a particular pressure  group.  That
group may not be  a product  user,  but  an  input  supplier,  such  as  the
concrete manufacturers  in the highway program or the lime producers
in  the Agricultural  Conservation  Program.
The  engineering  mentality  strongly  supports  the institution  of  ad
hoc public spending  over other institutional  alternatives.  For example,
if  there  is  a  perceived  flood  control  problem,  it  is  suggested  that
structures  be  built  with  public  funds.  Zoning  to  redirect  locational
decisions  is  not part of the approach,  and there  is little reference  to  a
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a single  variety  of technical  solution. Every agency  is  trying  to get  on
the  environmental  bandwagon.  But  that  does  not  mean  they  have
changed  their programs  much.  The  Corps  of  Engineers  and  the  Soil
Conservation  Service  are  perfectly  willing  to  add  water  quality  to
their multiple  purpose  dam  water storage  needs.  This  will  be used to
show  that  what  the  agencies  wanted  to  do  anyway  now  generates
more  benefits  than before.  Whether  it is  the  cheapest  way  to  improve
water  quality  or  whether  the  locations  are  the  most  desirable  are
questions  asked  by  troublemakers  and  obstructionists-not  by  the
engineering  mentality  that  gets things  done.
The  engineering  attitude  seldom  challenges  existing  power  rela-
tionships.  The  present  private  landowners  and  manufacturers  of  in-
puts tend to be served.  For example,  it favors the  institution  of public
acquisition  over  use  of police  power  regulation.  This  is illustrated by
the  Highway Beautification  Act of  1965,  which provided for removal
of billboards,  but required  the  state  to  pay just  compensation  for  the
taking  of  the  right to  erect  and  maintain  such  signs.  Supporters  of
this  policy  do  not  inquire  how  the  landowners  came  by  this  right
which was  so freely  acknowledged.
The  engineering  mentality  is  not  solely  possessed  by  engineering
organizations.  Let us examine  the role of the courts in  this regard.  In
a particular case  in New  Jersey,  a pipeline company  wanted to put  a
line  across  a wildlife preserve owned  by a  nonprofit  organization  and
maintained  for esthetic  use.  There  is  a great thrust in  case  and statu-
tory law  supporting  condemnation  for  utilities.  The  general  rule  has
been that the  only actionable  question is  the amount of compensation.
The  courts  are  exceedingly  reluctant  to  permit  litigation  over  the
necessity  or  wisdom  of  a  condemnation  or  the  way  it  is  exercised.
There  is  surely  something  to  say  for  cutting  off  interminable  argu-
ments over such questions  as alternative  sites, since  each owner  would
like  to  shift  taking  to  a  neighbor.  Nevertheless,  this  is  characteristic
of the  engineering  attitude.
In this  particular  case,  the  wildlife  preserve  was  able  to  get  the
court  to hear  the  case.  The pipeline  company  wanted  to  lay  its  line
along  an  upland  forested  route  requiring  tree  removal  and  causing
erosion  and siltation  of  a  marsh  area.  The wildlife  preserve  manage-
ment  would have  preferred no  pipeline  at  all  over  their area,  for  any
location  affected the natural habitat.  Yet,  they knew they  could never
win that one,  so they argued that  a lowland  marsh  route would  affect
the  wildlife  values  the least  since  the  danger  of  erosion  was  reduced.
In  the  course  of  the  trial,  the  judge  discovered  another  alternative,
namely,  with  proper  techniques  and  care  the  upland  route  could  be
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people  asserted,  but  could  not  show  factually,  that  the .marshland
location would  create  less  damage  to the  environment  than the care-
ful  use  of  the  upland  route.  The  pipeline  company  agreed  to  follow
certain  techniques  and  protective  measures  and  the  court  allowed
them  to proceed with  their preferred  location.
If public groups want to change  environmental  management,  they
had better be  prepared  to  present  to the  courts  (or  to any  decision
point)  concrete  alternatives  with  clear connections  to  environmental
results,  and  not  mere  assertions.  They  will  need  information  which
shows  alternatives  in  increments  gained  and  lost.  In this  case,  it  was
obvious  that the pipeline  would be  more costly  to  lay in the  lowland.
The court  did  not have  to face  the  issue  of  weighing  this  extra  cost
against the incremental  environmental  damage  since  no  evidence  was
presented  to  show  that there  was  an  incremental  damage  difference
between  the  carefully  utilized  upland  site  and  the  lowland  site.  It
did not explicitly  examine the  issue  of  extra costs,  but in  effect ruled
that the extra cost of more careful  digging  and  revegetation  were  off-
set by mitigation  of wildlife damage.  The court  got  a feel for  the size
of this extra construction  cost by the  fact  that  as the  trial  proceeded
the  pipeline  company  volunteered  to  use  the  ameliorating  practices.
Joseph  Sax,  a  legal  scholar,  observes  that the  court's  ability  and
willingness to intervene rested upon "the assurance  that the  case would
not be merely  a vague debate  over values,  but rather a rigorous  com-
parison  between  two  precise  and  available  alternatives  with  specific
evidence  of specific damage to be  used to compare them."  On the  face
of it,  this  seems  consistent with  the  above  argument  for  presentation
of specific  trade-off  and  cause-effect  information.  But,  it is  subject  to
an engineering  mentality interpretation.  Just  what "precise  and  avail-
able"  alternatives  are  to  be  considered?  The  case  suggests  that  not
building the pipeline  at all  is not in the court's  thought  pattern.  How
about  an  alternative  energy  source  which  does  not  require  soil  re-
moval  to provide  for transmission?  How  about putting the population
growth somewhere  else where  it can  be served with less environmental
disturbance?  Where  will  these  questions  be  considered?  Sax  suggests
that we should not expect it of the courts, nor  are they the appropriate
institution.  He  says  courts  "are  not  only professionally  conservative,
but  they  are  genuinely  and  correctly  concerned  about  their  com-
petence  and their proper role in such disputes." While there are excep-
tions,  the  courts  seem  better  able  to  handle  decisions  involving  more
marginal  alternatives.
Before  leaving  discussion  of  the  engineering  mentality,  I  should
take  care  to  say  that the  term  is not  meant to  characterize  all engi-
115neers,  nor is  it  limited  to them.  However,  this  is  what their  job  fre-
quently  calls  for,  and  we  need  competent  people  who  can  solve  the
problems  put  forward  in  this  context.  Still,  it  is  a  limited  view  and
reaction has  set in.
EFFICIENCY  VERSUS  HUMANITY
One attack on narrow  efficiency  calculation  is  glorification  of gut
feeling  as  an  approach  to  environmental  problem  definition,  that  is,
if our present  state  is  the  result  of  economic  calculation,  then  let  us
turn  to  spontaneous  action.  Act,  don't  think!  Let  your  instinct  be
your guide.  One  writer in commenting  on proposals for new highways
and tall buildings in San Francisco  noted that  advocates present many
tables  and  charts  to  show  the  tax  benefits  and  how  market  valued
needs are  met. He admonishes  opponents not to play  this game.  Don't
investigate  to  see if  the  charts  are  correct  and  don't prepare  any  of
your  own  showing  other  effects.  Simply  insist that  tall  buildings  are
bad and stand  (or  sit-in)  ready to die for what you know  is  right.
The consumer decision  to purchase  an orange,  enjoy the tax bene-
fits  of new buildings, or  avoid the view of tall buildings  and auto smog
all  come  ultimately  to the  same focus-the  human  personality.  Man
is the  measure  and measurer.  The consumption  of market  goods such
as steel and nonmarket  goods such as  air both  affect his being.  As  the
hip poets say,  "You are what you  eat."
Why  should  we  employ  intellect  and  economic  thinking  for  one
type of good  and not another?  We must test  the  charts  and  tables  of
developers  and the assertions of conservationists  on the same  anvil  of
humanity.  We  need  to  create  institutions  to  relate  choices  of  these
widely  different  kinds of  goods,  for  ultimately  man  is  a  whole  being
and not two separate  entities consuming market goods on the one hand
and  nonmarket  goods  on  the  other.  Science  becomes  an  input  into
these product  and  institutional  choices  by  showing  relationships  and
consequences.  But,  this  does  not  make  the  choice  easier,  just  more
intelligent.
The  freedom  implied  in  the  above  argument  is  frightening  to
many.  Policy educators should  be aware  of the escapes  from  freedom
that  are  offered  people.  One  is  retreat  to  the  engineering  mentality,
where  we can  pretend  that no choice  is  really involved  since what  to
do is merely a deduction from present population  trends and consump-
tion rates.  The familiar,  "you can't  fight city  hall,"  is a variety of  this
escape.  The  wrong kind  of people  may  be  produced,  but  that  is just
something  one learns to live with.
Another escape  is retreat  to the cult of the expert.  If engineers  (or
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us set up  some  boards  of ecologists  to control  things.  We  can  hardly
deny  this new group  its  areas  of  vertical  control  because  this  is  cer-
tainly the  mode  for  regulating  everything  from  medical  standards  to
television.  We  have  set  up  organizations  that  either  explicitly  have
representatives  from  the  professions  they  ostensibly  control  or  are
captured  by  those  they  are  supposed  to  regulate.  We  have  largely
ignored  how these experts  come  to be selected  for  these positions.
The  fact  that  no  one  of  these  experts  thought  about  the  final
product  (which is us-the whole  man)  is ignored in this institutional
approach.  Many ecologists do not practice a truly ecological  approach.
They  talk  about  interaction  of  organisms  but  frequently  fail  to  ask
what preservation  of the  osprey  has to  do  with better  human  beings.
If this  question  were  asked,  it  might be discovered  that  fighting  rats
and  controlling  drunk  drivers  are  more  important  environmental
issues.  Some  ecologists  I know  would  even  deny  the  relevancy  of the
question  since nature  is  a value in itself for them-again  an  example
of making us  schizophrenic,  which  is,  ironically,  nonecological.  I be-
lieve that policy educators must help people  learn  to trust  themselves,
for people  are  the  only  experts on  the whole  man.
Another  escape from freedom  is to glory  in unthinking gut choice.
This is  a sort of anticollective  action  in  any form.  In fact,  community
action  of  any  kind  is  suspect,  and  all  administration  and  authority
must be reduced,  if not  abolished.  We must get  down  to each person
doing his own thing.  There would be no  eminent domain or taxation.
This radical solution does not appeal to me, and I doubt it will produce
the  kind  of  people  its  supporters  want,  but  its  popularity  is  a  fact
that educators  cannot ignore.
A less  severe subset of gut choice  is the  attack on evaluation tech-
niques  such as  PPBS (Planning,  Programing,  and  Budgeting  System)
and  benefit-cost  analysis.  Interestingly,  the  attack  is  made  by  some
environmentalists  as  well  as  some  developers.  The proposition  is  that
economic  type  calculation  is  only  suitable  for  market  priced  goods,
and if new values  are to be taken  into account,  these  techniques  must
be replaced.  I believe  it would  be  a tragedy if  in our  attempt to intro-
duce  new  values  into  environmental  decisions,  we  should  abandon
that part of economic  thought which emphasizes  systematic  display  of
opportunities  foregone.  Economic  rationality  can  insure  that  new
values  and priorities,  whatever  they  are,  will  be  effectively  obtained.
One  of the reasons  that we  have  made  such  little  environmental  im-
provement is the gross inefficiency  in the application  of those resources
and  energies  that we  have devoted  to it. Efficiency  calculation  is  not
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and segregated  specialist decision  making is the real threat.
END  OF  LIBERALISM
Our  institutions  for  formulating  and  communicating  demand  for
publicly  provided  inputs  affecting man's  being  have  been largely  pre-
dicated on interest groups.  Our rules are based on the dogma of simple
pluralism,  which  means  that  many  interest  groups  compete  for  the
favor  of  government.  Present  institutions  tend  to  focus  bargaining
on specific  public  acts, programs,  and projects  rather than on  general
system  rules  and  directional  policy.  Pluralism  is  the  political  equiva-
lent  of  pure  competition  in  the  market.  Self-regulating  competitive
equilibrium  is  emphasized  with  little  specific  attention  to  overall
performance.  This has led to loss of public confidence in government's
ability  to  solve  problems.  Each  organized  group  secures  help  from
government  in  its  own  special  area.  For  example,  big  farmers  get
price  supports,  doctors  get  controlled  entry,  industry  gets  tariffs,  and
bird watchers  get wildlife  preserves.
Still,  as  I  have  been  insisting,  man  is  a  whole  being.  A  person
belonging to  a potent  group can protect his  income, but that may not
give him much toward  a good life in total.  The big farmer may  secure
his  income but suffer poor rural  community  services.  The doctor  may
enjoy  his  income  but still  get  mugged  (and  may even  have  difficulty
getting  good medical service).  Bird watchers  may  have  preserves  but
never  see nature  in  their workaday  world.
We  are  pluralistic  in the  sense  that  no one  group  controls  every-
thing.  But,  it  also  means  that no  one  has  thought  much  about  the
total product-man-that  emerges.  Each  group  can  use government
to help  supply  one  dimension  (albeit  a  major one)  of  its  members'
total  inputs.  The  things  in common  tend  to  be  lost.  And  that  is  our
sickness!
Solving pieces  of the problem  will not suffice,  and even those who
do relatively well by the process  are  losing  faith in the  ability  of gov-
ernment to  really  make  the  total  environment  better.  This  is  not  to
say that  they  will  easily let go  of their individual  hold  on  the  collec-
tive power.
We have  also  taken  on too  many  good causes  without  a  sense  of
priority  or  complementarity,  and  the  effect  is  disillusionment.  The
environment  is  just  one  of  the  most  recent  concerns  where  we  have
extended  government  through  new  agencies,  some  public  spending,
and  a  few  new prohibitions,  and  of  course,  many more  forms  to  fill
out.  Much  of  this  is  a  circus  for  the  masses  which  pretends  action
without doing much  that is measurable  in people's  experience.
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and who represent  a hole in the pluralism  dogma.  They have  realized
that  the  great  liberal-conservative  debate  over  more  or  less  govern-
ment  is  misleading.  The  liberal  bleeding  hearts  support  great  ex-
tensions  of  government  which  really  do  not  deliver,  for  example,
urban  renewal,  which  evacuates  the poor  rather  than  building  hous-
ing for them.
The  conservatives  have  never  really  been  against  government,
just  against  the  wrong  people  using  its  power.  Much  of  the  public
power  serves  them by  such  things  as having  a regulatory  commission
help  a particular  group  to do things  it could  not do  as  effectively for
itself  as  a completely  private organization.  Much  of the public  spend-
ing  power goes for  things  that could be  done  privately,  which  leaves
so little  for uniquely  public  functions.  This  burden is  producing  tax-
payer revolts  against  the general concept  of  government  spending.
All  of  the  above  adds  up  to  a  crisis  for  collective  institutions.
People  are  becoming  disillusioned  by government  in general  whether
they  be  rich or poor,  young  or old.  Only  a  few  die-hard  liberals  re-
main enthusiastic.  They are still talking of massive  new programs  and
new bureaucracies.  But this  is the end of liberalism!
PROPERTY  AND  COMMUNITY  CHOICE
We  can probably  do  without  liberals,  but we  cannot  do without
a sense  of  community  and  collective  action.  We  must not  conclude
from  our failures that collective choice  is to be abandoned but  rather
that we should choose more wisely and look to more basic institutional
changes if we want a significant change  in environment and man. I be-
lieve  we  must look  in  the  direction  of  some  fundamental  redistribu-
tion and redefinition  of property rights which form the basis for system-
wide rules  and  policies  rather  than the  present  emphasis  on  interest
group bargaining  over  individual  projects  and  regulatory  actions.  A
series of examples  will illustrate.
Example 1.  There is talk of effluent charges to control water pollu-
tion.  The  charge  is  really  a  rental  of  a  resource  where  the  owner
transfers  use  rights  for  a  periodic  fee.  If  costs  were  associated  with
use of resources  for waste  disposal,  there  would be  a different  alloca-
tion of  the  resource.  But  there  is  a fundamental  directional  question
which makes these  charges  function.  That is whether the public  owns
the  resource  in  the  first  place  and  is  in  a  position  to  ask  for  rent.
The thrust of present property law  is that right follows appropria-
tion.  As  new  aspects  of  resources become  valuable,  the right  of  use
goes  frequently  to  those  who  can  in  fact  make  physical  use.  It  is
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resources  as  well.  The  burden  of  proof  to  support  any  other  result
rests with  the  conservationist,  not  the  developer.  This  is  the tremen-
dous  dynamic  built  into  present  property  law  that  is  not  overcome
by  marginal  changes  in  institutions  such  as  new  spending  programs,
zoning  commissions,  or  the like.
Example 2.  Let  us  look  at  attempts  to  get  a  better  environment
by controlling land  use through  zoning.  It is perhaps  a bit of an  over-
statement,  but  it is  not far wide  of  the  mark  to  say  that zoning  is  a
failure.  It fails  to  effectively  shape  developing  areas.  The rewards  to
private  owners  who  can  break  the  zoning  from  a  single  family  resi-
dential  to  high  rise  apartment  or commercial  are  considerable.  This
institution  standing  alone  cannot  resist  the  pressure  resulting  from
the  underlying  property  laws,  which  in  effect  say  that the  impact  of
community  action  on  property  values  is  captured  by the  owner.  Un-
less  we  change  this  basic  thrust  of  the  law  and  deny  some  of  the
publicly  created  value  to the  owner,  who  did  nothing  to  produce  it,
the  more marginal  institution  of zoning  will  remain  as  it is,  a monu-
ment to faint hearts.
Example 3. Another direction  in which we  might look for funda-
mental  change  is  to pay  more  explicit  attention  to  the  rules  for  bar-
gaining among governmental units,  that is, more effective  implementa-
tion  of  our pluralistic  philosophy.  We  have  a  pluralistic  philosophy
of competition  among  pressure  groups,  but  little  attention  has  been
given  to  the rules  for  this  competition.  Part  of  the  problem  may  be
that government  is  not seen  as  consisting  of  bargaining  units.  Some
conceive  of it in only  hierarchical  terms  with  lines  of  command  run-
ning from  the  legislature  through  the  chief  executive  to  the  agency.
Yet,  much  bargaining  goes  on between  agencies  which  really  repre-
sent  different  groups.
It  is  very  awkward  for  a  dispute  between  state  agencies  to  be
settled  by the courts  since the  attorney  general  would  be in the posi-
tion  of  representing  both  parties.  This  means  disputes  are  usually
bargained  out in  less  explicit  forums  not open  to  public  view.  This
fosters  trades  which  are  sufficient  to  keep  sleeping  dogs  asleep  but
not  necessarily  to  solve  conflicts  which  remain  festering  even  if
unidentified  as to source.
It  is  popular  in  many  circles  to  support  interagency  planning
efforts.  An  example  is  so-called  comprehensive  river  basin  planning
under  the  U.S.  Water  Resources  Planning  Act.  These  have  largely
failed  to  clearly  define  objectives  and  establish  priorities  because
each  agency  puts  in  its  pet  schemes  regardless  of  the  conflicts.  The
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is because  we  have not  first openly  debated  the rules  for  interagency
bargaining.  We  just  put  them  together  with  a  gross  laissez  faire  ap-
proach.  However,  if  we  did  think  through  the  bargaining  rules,  we
would have to accept the responsibility  for influencing  performance.  It
satisfies  some  to  escape  by  saying  that  whatever  emerges  from  these
interagency  rituals  is  the  best  that  can  be  done,  even  if  lamentable.
Since  many interest  groups  are  represented,  it  is  pluralistic  and  that
is enough  of a criteria for some.
Example 4.  A  final  example  to  illustrate  the  direction  in  which
I think we  could move  if  we  want more  fundamental  changes  in en-
vironment  involves  the  role  of  the  courts.  Michigan  has  just  passed
a law  which  allows  citizens  to  sue polluters  or state  agencies  without
having  to  show  that  they  suffered  particular  and  unusual  personal
damage.  This  allows  action  against anyone  affecting the environment,
even  if  the  governmental  agency  responsible  for  its  regulation  has
failed  to act.  The standard  referred  to in  the law  provides  that  action
can  be  taken  to  protect  the  public  trust  in  natural  resources  from
impairment.  Defense  may show  that  "there  is no feasible and  prudent
alternative  to defendant's  conduct  and that such conduct  is  consistent
with  the promotion  of  the public  health,  safety  and  welfare  in  light
of  the state's  paramount  concern  for the protection  of  its natural  re-
sources."  Such  a  broad  standard  can  be  supported  by  people  who
have  widely  different  views  on  the  desirable  environment.  I  believe
these  vaguely  stated  standards  only  lead  to public  cynicism  and  con-
tribute  to  the  crisis  in  respect  for  public  authority  and  collective
action.
We should  not expect  a great  deal  from this citizen  suit law.  The
law  probably  would  not  be  necessary  if  the  state  natural  resource
regulatory  agencies  had been  given  clear guidelines  for  their  actions
in the first place.  This  deficiency  cannot be corrected  by still  another
procedure  with  no  clear statement  of policy  and  standards.  The  new
law begs the question  of  what the  public's  ownership  claim  really  is.
I suspect that is why the bill got such wide support.  It talks of protect-
ing  the public  trust in natural  resources  but  never  says  what  that  is.
Surely,  there  is  a reference  point  in the  common  law,  but  this  is  a
slow and  usually marginal process.  It is not the place  where  decisions
on new directions  should be made.  We must look to the legislature  for
more  precise  expressions  that the  public  recognizes  its  sickness  and
wants  to  make  fundamental  changes  by  redirecting  resources  from
paper,  chemicals,  and  steel to other things  which can contribute  more
at this point to mankind.
The Michigan  legislature  has  never  firmly  stated  what  resources
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protect  the public  trust, whatever  that  is.  Perhaps  this  is  because  the
public wants  to escape  from freedom  and does not want to admit that
property rights  are not defined  by deities  but by public  affirmation  of
who  counts  and  has  power  and  what  common  environmental  out-
comes  the people  really choose  for themselves.
It  was  stated  earlier  that  the dichotomy  of more  versus  less  gov-
ernment was not very useful.  Changes in property law  and more  pre-
cise  standards  for public agencies  involve  government  to  be  sure,  but
they are quite different from those changes that necessarily involve new
agencies,  employees,  and budgets.
To  conclude,  those  who  think  the  use  of  our  resources  must  be
redirected  in  major  ways  to  produce  a  better  mankind  should  give
more attention to  institutions  which fundamentally  reshape  the power
relations  of our  society  in certain  key  priority  areas.  This puts  more
emphasis on basic property rights definition which can redirect private
market  transactions  as  well  as  governmental  bargaining  and  less  on
things  like  piecemeal  public  spending,  zoning,  or  even  regulatory
bureaucracies.  This latter  group  of  institutions  has  its place,  but suc-
cess  in  application  depends  on  some  fundamental  restatements  of
basic property rights in resources.  For example,  we either say apprecia-
tion  of land values  due to public  action  belongs  to the private  owner
or not. The public  either owns the paramount use rights in small trout
streams  or it does not.  Much of the rest of the environmental  control
trappings  are  marginal.  They  only  keep  the  masses  quiet  while  pro-
viding jobs for lawyers,  planners,  and economists.
ROLE  OF  THE  PUBLIC  POLICY  EDUCATOR
Much  of  our  concern  with  environment  is  relatively  recent  and
people  just  have not  made  up  their  minds  on  relative  values.  I  am
impressed  by  the  large  proportion  of  people  who  respond  to  public
opinion  surveys  with  "don't  know."  Another  common  situation  is
when  people  have  decided,  but  in  widely  different  directions.  The
standoffs  and  lack  of  public  action  which  emerge  from  the  above
factors  are  becoming  increasingly  costly  since  the  dynamics  of  our
current  institutions  favor  the  developer.  Even  if  the developers  and
their consumers  are in the minority, they carry the day if the majority
is  split  or  undecided  over  the  alternative.  In  the  past,  we  have
developed  new  institutions  by  a  slow  experimental  trial  and  error
process.  This  will no  longer  do,  or  we  shall  have  substantially  fewer
alternative  results to choose from.
Extension  education  can  help  people  discover  common  ground
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a  great  need  to  reach  substantial  consensus  on  new  environmental
issues  more  quickly.  Some  think  the  educational  process  and  mass
political  representation  of  the  new  consensus  is  inherently  too  slow.
This  explains  those  who  want  a  larger  role  for  individual  citizen
court  suits  as  well  as the  rock  thrower  and  rioters.  Much  energy  is
being wasted looking  for institutional  loopholes  where  the  well mean-
ing  few  can  get  new  environmental  performance  without  educating
and persuading  the many.  I believe  this  is  dangerous.  We must bring
the  majority  along  or  we  are  lost.  This  is  the  challenge  of  public
policy education.
The  role  I urge  for policy  educators  raises  its  own  issues  for  in-
stitutional  control.  Education  changes  relationships  among  people,
but  little thought  has been given  to  its  rules.  Perhaps  this  is because
it is  regarded  as  a voluntary  laissez  faire exchange,  and people  do not
have to listen.  This  is hiding  our head in the sand, for the timing and
packaging  of  information  affects  public  choice.  If  formal  education
becomes more involved  in helping resolve  conflicts and  creating com-
mon  ground,  the  rules  for  its  competition  with  other  information
sources  will  become  more  critical.  At  present,  it  is  common  for  a
prominent  politician  or  group  spokesman  to  assert  that  a  certain
proposed  institutional  rule  will  have  a  given  effect.  This will  be  re-
ported  in  newspapers  without  any  attempt  to  check  its  accuracy.  It
will  stand  as  the  only  widely  read  information  that  forms  public
opinion  on  a  given issue  in  a certain  locale.  While  academics  might
be inclined to favor rules  insuring wider  access to some of the media,
our academic  freedom  instincts  favor no public rules  for our own be-
havior.  There  are  as  few  system  rules  for  extension  priorities  as  for
public works projects.
But  we  public  educators  cannot  insist  on  information  exchange
rules  for others  and  omit ourselves.  If there  are no rules  for informa-
tion  exchange,  the  situation  will  be  dominated  by  those  who  can
appropriate  attention,  and  publicly  supported  education  may  not  be
very  influential.  To be  influential  at  all  may  require  a  self-discipline
that lies  at the heart of all collectively  created property rights.
CONCLUSION
Institutions  reflect  the  basic  underlying  covenants  and  values  of
society.  One set of rules for relating people follows from  the engineer-
ing approach  to human problems and another set from  the gut feeling
approach.  Institutions  embody  the  major directional  choices  that  are
widely  shared.  If  society  judges  that  no  major  changes  in  direction
are  wanted,  then  such  institutions  as  zoning  and  some  new  subsidy
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condition  constitutes  a  sickness  requiring  a major  change,  then  the
institutional  analyst  and  policy  educator  can  prescribe  more  basic
changes  in our  underlying property  rights  definition  and  distribution.
To  accomplish  a  major  change  in  performance  of  the  economy
and in its product-man-requires  fundamental  changes  in  the  rules
of  human  relationships  and  power.  I  have  illustrated  this  type  of
change  by  the  efforts  to  define  the  specific  extent  of  public  owner-
ship in  water resources  and the ownership  of land value  appreciation
created  by public  acts.
These  are  not matters  for  faint hearts.  They change  basic  power
relations,  the  locus  of  decision  making,  and  items  of  accountability.
But  if people  come  to  believe  that the  human  potential  is  not  being
realized  with present  institutions,  this  is  the  direction  to look.  Policy
educators  should  not  fool  the  people  into  thinking  that  any  lesser
kinds of institutional  changes will  do!
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